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Measuring Local Autonomy:
A Decision-making Approach
FREDERIK FLEURKE & ROLF WILLEMSE
Department of Public Administration and Organisation Science,
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands
ABSTRACT In studies on central–local relations it is common to assess local autonomy
in a deductive way. The extent of local autonomy is determined by measuring the
central legal and ﬁnancial competence, after which the remaining room for local
decision-making is determined. The outcome of this indirect method is that the
autonomy of local government tends to be systematically underestimated. As an
alternative this paper introduces a decision-making approach in which local decisions
are systematically weighed on three dimensions: agenda setting, freedom in choices, and
dependency. Using Dutch data, the authors come to the conclusion that a locally
oriented perspective leads to a more accurate and positive judgement of the autonomy of
local government.
Central–local relations, or intergovernmental relations, receive unceasing
attention from scholars and practitioners, as is evidenced by recent special
issues of several journals (Peters & Pierre, 2001; Carmichael & Midwinter,
2002; Agranoﬀ, 2004; Wagenaar & Rutgers, 2004). The same holds true for
concepts like decentralisation and local autonomy, since they are key
elements in the study of intergovernmental relations.
Typical of many studies in intergovernmental relations is the – as we
would call it – deductive approach. In this approach decentralisation and
local autonomy are implicitly or explicitly treated as interrelated concepts:
the more decentralisation, the larger the local autonomy, and vice versa (see
also Fesler, 1965; Rolla, 1998; Fleurke & Willemse, 2004). This assumed
correlation is particularly present in studies that deal with divisions of power
or competencies between governmental tiers. A second feature of the
deductive approach is that indicators of decentralisation are measured at a
macro- or national level, from which the extent of local autonomy is
subsequently deduced.
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Within this broad approach two sets of indicators can be discerned.
Firstly, there are legal indices, like the formal distribution of tasks between
governmental tiers, the formal constitutional competencies and protection
of local government, the scope of supervision or inspection procedures, or
the formal access of local government into central decision-making like legal
consultation procedures and the possibility of cumul des mandats (Page &
Goldsmith, 1987; Page, 1991; Norton, 1991, 1994; Gustaﬀson, 1991; OECD,
1997; Lijphart, 1999; Loughlin, 2001; EU/Committee of the Regions, 2001;
Jourmard & Kongsrud, 2003). If, for example, the prime responsibility of
most government functions and services have been designated to central
government, or if local government does not possess a constitutionally
granted autonomy and the possibility to appeal to the court in case of a
central intrusion of its autonomy, the administrative system is centralised
and the autonomy of local government small.
A second type of indicators concerns the ﬁnancial and economical
aspects, for example the relative amount of revenues raised by central or
local government, used by Lijphart in 1984. Using this indicator one might
say that a system is more centralised if central government raises relatively
more revenues than local government. Consequently, local power and
autonomy will be small. The relative amount of local government in the
total government expenditure is another indicator (Sharpe, 1988). The
higher this is, the more decentralised a system is.
We question whether the deductive approach and its indicators are
adequate for a careful assessment of local autonomy. Several authors
have pointed out the diﬃculties of measuring decentralisation and
autonomy (notably Smith, 1979; 1985; Wolman, 1990). Central rules
might frequently be used selectively by local governments, as they do not
always ﬁt the problem situation. In other cases central rules are only used
as conﬂict-solving mechanisms. The extent to which central supervision
actually aﬀects the behaviour of local governments depends on the scope
of inspection procedures, available sanctions, the competences of the
involved administrators, and other variables. In general, legal indices
generate information about the potency of instruments of central
government, rather than give a clear insight into the actual autonomy
of local government. Also, indicators concerning the ﬁnancial and
economical aspects of intergovernmental relations are not suited to
assess local autonomy, because ﬁnancial central–local relations are
characterised by all kinds of speciﬁc grants, limits to expenditures, rate
capping, etc. (compare Blair, 1991). Moreover, the relative local amount
of total government expenditure fails to provide data on the discretion of
spending. Additionally, a relatively small capacity for raising own
revenues does not exclude the possibility that most of the municipal
income consists of a general, non-earmarked grant. In that respect, these
macro-indicators at best oﬀer a partial picture of autonomy (compare
Agranoﬀ, 2004).
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A more accurate assessment of local autonomy can be made, leaving
macro-indicators aside, by centring the analysis on local administrative
practice, which is subsequently related to the activities of other authorities.
In this case, a deﬁnition of local autonomy will not point to all kinds of
formal and legal constellations like the distribution of decision-making
competencies, ﬁnancial relations, inspection regimes (see e.g. the multi-
dimensional deﬁnition of autonomy given by Verhoest et al., 2004), but to
what local government actually does and does not do.
In this article we will develop an alternative method in which local
autonomy is measured in a direct way. This method will subsequently be
applied to data on Dutch local government. To summarise, the following
questions will be answered in this paper:
1. How can local autonomy be measured, if the local decision-making
practice is taken as object of analysis?
2. To what extent do the resulting conclusions on Dutch local autonomy
diﬀer from the ones drawn based on the deductive approach?
The Dutch Case
Before we proceed with presenting our alternative perspective, a few
remarks about Dutch local government. Basically the formal position of
Dutch local government – de gemeenten or municipalities – is roughly
similar to the German Gemeinden and the Scandinavian municipalities.
Dutch local government has a general competence and because of that the
possibility to adjust its policies to changing circumstances whenever it thinks
this necessary.
Dutch municipalities consist of a council – of which the members are
directly elected every four years – and a board consisting of mayor and
aldermen. This board is responsible for the civil service and can be conceived
as the executive branch of the municipality. The board members are
accountable to the council members and can be dismissed by them.
In the Dutch debate the approaches of local autonomy are deductive in
nature using the aforementioned macro-indices. For example, it has been
argued that the formally decentralised unitary state can hardly be called
‘decentralised’ because constitutional law does not contain any guarantee
against the enduring central limitations on local discretion (like the
possibility to appeal in court). Moreover, in almost every area central
government has designed legislation to steer and order local government
(Hennekens, 1996; 2000). Hennekens’ conclusion that local government is
insubordinate to central government has been grounded in an analysis of
formal rules and legislation.
The Scientiﬁc Council for Government Policy (WRR, 1995) and Do¨lle
and Elzinga (1996) came to similar conclusions based on the same
indicators. They added that local government has also lost autonomy to
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functionally organised single-purpose organisations (like quangos). This
judgement was based on the simple observation that the number of these
organisations has rapidly increased (also Hagelstein, 1993). Do¨lle and
Elzinga further pointed to the demise of local discretion because of the rigid
ﬁnancial speciﬁcation of central–local relations, which feature a relatively
large amount of earmarked speciﬁc grants (around 55 per cent in 1995;
only 16 per cent of the municipal income consisted of own revenues;
Havermans, 1998).
The historical research of Veldheer (1994) also follows a deductive way
of reasoning. He analysed the annual budgets, the council agendas, and
the functions in the civil service organisation in two municipalities over a
period of 150 years. His main goal was to sketch the development of the
local public tasks and to determine whether local government has
developed from a municipality in a night watch state (performing mainly
police tasks) to a municipality in a welfare state (with an emphasis on
social security). He found that Dutch municipalities did indeed roughly
undergo these changes. Current activities as indicated by the budgets,
council decisions and the civil service organisation, take place in areas
where central government has developed a substantial amount of
interference and where it has issued a lot of legislation and statutory
measures. This brought him to the conclusion that Dutch local
government had become nothing more than a will-less tool of central
government. He did not, however, research how much discretion every
single council decision, budget item or job description entails.
The Dutch case oﬀers a good opportunity to apply our decision-making
approach and to assess whether it will lead to diﬀerent conclusions than the
ones that follow a deductive perspective. Will the generally rather negative
view on the autonomy of Dutch local government be reproduced or does a
more positive judgement emerge? In order to answer this, we will
concentrate on the local decision-making process in the period in which
Hennekens, Do¨lle and Elzinga and the other authors mentioned have drawn
their conclusions: 1990–95.
Analysing Local Decision-making
Conceptualising Autonomous Decision-making
How can the autonomy of local government be measured? As explained
in the introduction, our starting-point is not national regulations or
ﬁnancial ratios, but the local government’s actual decision-making
practice. More concretely, in order to obtain a satisfactory view of the
functioning of local government with respect to other levels of govern-
ment, it is necessary to identify all the externally-oriented local
government decisions and to study their relations to the activities of other
government authorities.
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We interpret autonomy as a concept with three dimensions:
. the extent to which local government determines its own agenda;
. the extent to which other government authorities give local government
freedom of policy-making (policy choices);
. the extent to which local government is dependent on other authorities in
its decision-making practices.
A completely autonomous decision is a decision taken independently of
other authorities, with a substantial extent of policy freedom and on the
board’s own initiative. In our deﬁnition we do not include formal
competencies, or constraints on these competencies like formal rules,
procedures, and requirements local government has to comply with
(compare Verhoest et al., 2004), since these elements – as we mentioned in
the introduction – essentially only give an indication of how autonomous
local government can be. Formal constraints are only relevant in so far as
they actually limit local discretion. For the same reason we do not include
elements like the ﬁnancial and personnel size of a municipality. These are
indicators of the size of tasks of a government rather than of its autonomy.
Again, if they tell us something about autonomy, it is about potential
autonomy (compare Wolman & Goldsmith, 1990; Goldsmith, 1990).
Our deﬁnition of autonomy is prompted by the necessity of using a local
perspective on actual everyday administrative practice. We can add to this
that from a democratic point of view it is important that local government
makes its own choices and sets its own agenda. Why else would a citizen
bother to turn up for elections? As Goldsmith (1995: 229) has pointed out, if
local governments ‘do not determine for themselves the mix of local goods
and services . . . the election of local representatives serves little purpose’
(also Hansen & Klausen, 2002).
Unit of Analysis
In our analysis we have conﬁned ourselves to the decisions made by the
municipal boards of mayor and aldermen. Though the council members are
elected directly, it is widely believed that the Dutch boards are the prime
municipal decision bodies (Denters, 1989; Tops & Depla, 1993; Elzinga,
1999). It is there that strategic and operational decision-making takes place
and political and bureaucratic spheres of inﬂuence converge. Moreover, any
issue on the agenda of a council is also discussed and prepared in the board
meetings, whereas the reverse is not true. In order to obtain a comprehensive
picture of autonomous decision-making, we could not rely on council
decisions alone.
Studying the entire process of actual decision-making at the lowest level
of the government apparatus meant that the number of case studies had to
be limited. Our study took place in 16 municipalities, with populations that
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varied from 1,091 to 84,668 inhabitants (the average of all 450 municipalities
in the Netherlands is around 35,000). We have addressed the decisions taken
by the boards in January, May and September 1993, a year belonging to a
period about which Dutch scholars expressed negative views on the
autonomy of Dutch local government (see second section). It is not likely
that the choice of another year would yield completely diﬀerent results.
Other analyses of decision-making in four municipalities in 1989, 1991 and
1996 did not give inexplicable diﬀerences (Willemse, 2004).
In all 16 municipalities, the chief executive oﬃcer of the civil service – the
secretary of the board meetings – held the opinion that the selected three
months were representative for the whole year. In quantitative terms, with
this selection we covered approximately 33 per cent of all decisions in 1993
(in August and parts of December and July the board members hardly meet
oﬃcially). In the end a total of 2,922 externally-oriented decisions were
examined. Decisions on the organisation and operation of the local
government apparatus itself were not included.
In the analysis we excluded the routine decisions. Routine decisions are
those resulting from previous decisions and therefore requiring no new
judgements, or are decisions which were taken more or less mechanically, as
the procedures and criteria were largely formalised. Examples are individual
social security grants, parking permits, small land transactions (if the
destination is ﬁxed), building permits (excluding those leading to a change in
zoning plans), standard answers to requests of individual citizens, and so on.
The ﬁrst reason to exclude routine decisions is that, although they form the
large majority of all the decisions taken in a municipality (compare Page,
2001), this category would obscure the view on autonomy in strategic local
decision-making. Democratic legitimacy of local authorities is primarily
grounded in the development or change of new policy, and not in the
routine performance of daily activities of civil servants, however important
the quality of the delivery of public services may be. The second reason to
exclude this category is that the proportion of this kind of decisions varied
considerably per municipality (ranging from 26 to 64 per cent), due to
diﬀerences in the delegation and mandate regulations in force. Because these
coincidental diﬀerences undermine the comparability of the results per
municipality we omitted the routine decisions from the rest of the analysis.
In order to obtain comparable results it was also necessary to clear the
records from double counts. In some municipalities an issue was set on the
agenda as a board decision and a few weeks later the same issue was
introduced as a proposal from the board to the council. Also, sometimes a
decision was split into several sub-decisions (a decision to render a
conditional grant, to actually pay, to amend the budget, to ask for account,
to judge the account, etc.), whereas in other municipalities only the ﬁrst or
most far reaching decision was placed on the agenda. Naturally, we choose
to score the respective issue or set of decisions just one time. In the end the
total number of decisions was reduced from 2,922 to 1,722.
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Elaboration on the Concept of Autonomy
How can we ascertain whether autonomy is limited, and – if relevant –
which government authorities have imposed the limitation? We identiﬁed
the following authorities: central government, the province, regional boards,
other municipalities and quangos. Under the latter we subsume all special-
purpose organisations that perform a public task (schools, hospitals, welfare
organisations, public transport companies, and the like). As said, we
distinguish three dimensions of autonomy.
1. Initiative. To assess who takes the initiative for a certain decision, we look
for a rule, law, demand, request, obligation or cause to which this decision
can be traced back. The actor who has issued the law, posed the demand,
etc., is the one who provoked the local decision. When no external inﬂuence
or incentive from another actor can be detected, the decision is considered to
have been taken on the board’s own initiative. Therefore this dimension is
spread dichotomously. An example of a board decision put on the agenda
by central government is a municipal plan to combat illiteracy among
immigrants. In this case the plan had to be developed in order to be eligible
for a speciﬁc grant. This grant is the ﬁnancial impetus that has provoked the
local decision. Other examples are changes in zoning plans because of a
formal instruction to keep in line with national physical planning, the
organisation of a petition among municipalities against centrally planned
cuts in the general grants, and an adjustment of the opening hours of shops
because of a change in the relevant national law. Examples of decisions
placed on the agenda by quangos are a request for cooperation in the
realisation of social housing projects, a request for subsidy by a social
welfare organisation, and a request by a school for extra support in the
maintenance of buildings and class rooms.
2. Freedom of choice. The extent to which other government authorities give
the board freedom in policy-making is dependent on whether the board has
the possibility to decide between at least two alternatives with substantially
diﬀerent eﬀects. If so, then the decision has been taken with freedom of
choice. Examples are zoning plans (destinations of land and buildings are
not prescribed), the rendering of a subsidy to community work (where
restrictive rules are usually set by the boards themselves), and the opening
up of a new suburb (the location of the road is not necessarily
predetermined). An example of a decision without freedom of choice is a
request by a school for maintenance funding. Dutch education laws and
rules are so detailed in their prescriptions that a local board does not have a
realistic option to refuse the request. Another example is a decision to clear
unexploded aircraft bombs from the Second World War. In this speciﬁc case
there is no explicit demand from central government to clear the bomb – the
municipality is the ﬁrst to be informed and it starts a clearance procedure
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independently – but central and provincial government would not allow the
board to do nothing. Clearing is the only option.
3. Dependency. Dependency of boards on other actors can take diﬀerent
forms, like the need for information, money, personnel, ground, and
permission. A decision scores as dependent when the decision cannot be
realised without the cooperation of another actor. In the case of physical
planning many decisions (like changes in zoning plans) are subject to
formal provincial scrutiny, but usually this procedure is a matter of
provincial routine. In our analysis decisions formally under supervision of
higher authorities have only been scored dependent if there was more than
just a formal notiﬁcation, as evidenced by provincial inspection reports
and the possible approval, veto or suspension. Other examples of
dependent decisions are a plan to realise housing for the elderly (the
exploitation and perhaps even realisation needs to be done by a housing
corporation), a plan to prevent school dropout (schools are required to
implement the policy), and the decision to ﬁll a ditch or canal (a water
board may need to provide technical information on the consequences on
the ground water level).
After having coded each decision on each of the three dimensions, an
aggregate autonomy score was calculated. The autonomy score per board is
the percentage of completely autonomous decisions, that is of the decisions
that have been taken autonomously on all three dimensions. In short, in
order to signify a decision as taken autonomously, we have used the strictest
criterion.
We also researched whether the autonomy diﬀers between policy areas.
Therefore, for each decision we determined to which policy area it mainly
pertained. We identiﬁed the following areas: (1) physical planning and land
aﬀairs (PP&LA), (2) public housing and building control (PH&BC), (3)
public welfare and recreation (PW&R), (4) traﬃc and transport (T&T), (5)
environment and sanitation (E&S), (6) economic aﬀairs, (7) public order
and safety (PO&S), (8) social aﬀairs, (9) tourism, (10) cultural aﬀairs, (11)
sports, (12) education, (13) public health, and (14) water works. Then, we
calculated the autonomy scores in each area.
Methods of Data Collection
Two methods of data collection have been employed. First of all, the data
were collected by means of study of the weekly issued lists of board decisions
and minutes of board meetings. If necessary, documents underlying the
studied decisions were also consulted. These documents or ﬁles often
consisted of relevant rules and legislation, minutes of internal deliberations
and external consultations, research reports, informal and formal corre-
spondence and so on. In about two-thirds of the cases the study of these ﬁles
was necessary.
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Secondly, interviews were conducted as a supportive reference. In these
interviews with senior oﬃcials we deliberately did not ask for overall
perceptions of local autonomy, since these might be biased by feelings of
frustration or deprivation caused by central government. We distanced
ourselves as much as possible from the wisdom of the day. The function of
the interviews was fact-ﬁnding. By checking every separate score we could
verify whether our reconstruction of the coming about of a certain decision
was an accurate reﬂection of how it actually went. In case other deviating
information came to light, for example on the decisive role a certain actor
has played, we needed to ﬁnd indications for this in the ﬁles.
The analysis of so many decisions with the methods just described will
seem sheer drudgery. In reality the research in each municipality took
around eight workdays. The analysis of the decisions was helped very much
by the fact that local civil servants register a lot and keep a lot of documents,
often even telephone notes. Also, individual municipal decisions generally
are not so complex that they are diﬃcult to fathom. This has contributed to
the pace of the research.
A possible objection against our method is that it does not take into
account informal inﬂuence because this will not be committed to paper.
Though we cannot exclude the possibility that we have incorrectly scored
decisions as taken autonomously, we are not convinced that this
measurement error distorts the results. Firstly, if another actor has indeed
played a decisive role, than at least the ﬁles should somewhere mention this
and oﬀer an indication of the actor’s inﬂuence. Secondly, as said before, the
municipal archives are very voluminous and much of the municipal work is
registered and documented. This holds for informal contacts as well, since
we also found telephone notes in the archives. Where we nonetheless
suspected that the archive concerned lacked important information or
indications of informal inﬂuence of other actors, we checked this with the
interviewees and processed the answers in our data set.
Autonomy of Municipal Boards
Boards operate relatively autonomously (see Table 1). In most munici-
palities more than half of the decisions satisfy the three requirements for
Table 1. Autonomy of local boards, expressed in percentages of all decisions
Decisions
Decisions, disregarding
quangos
Taken on own initiative 63.8 75.3
Independent 75.9 83.3
Freedom in choices 97.6 97.6
Aggregated autonomy score 52.2 70.3
N 1722 1326
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autonomy: they were taken at the board’s own initiative, independently and
with substantial policy freedom. The average autonomy score is 52.2 per
cent. If we disregard quangos and limit our analysis to central government,
the province, the region and other municipalities, we ﬁnd that the average
score rises to 70.3 per cent.
Table 2 shows that quangos impose most of the restrictions on the
autonomy of boards: 47.3 per cent of the non-autonomous decisions
required some form of coordination with one or more of these bodies.
Diﬀerences between municipalities are to be seen mainly in their relations
with central and regional authorities. Some municipalities are more aﬀected
by central government inﬂuence, others by regional authorities. Provincial
governments do not play an important role in the board’s decision-making
in any of the municipalities.
On which areas have the boards taken their decisions? In Table 3 the
percentages of the decisions taken in each area are given. Setting ten per cent
Table 2. Inﬂuence of other authorities on local boards, expressed in percentages of all non-
autonomous decisions (N¼ 840), and in numbers of municipalities with more than 30 per cent
non-autonomous decisions
Inﬂuence of other authorities
Number of
municipalities4 30%
Central government 24.5 2
Province 12.3 0
Region, other municipalities 28.7 5
Quangos 47.3 16
Table 3. Importance of policy areas, expressed in percentages of decisions taken in the respective
areas (N¼ 1722), and number of municipalities with more than 10 per cent decisions in the
respective area; average autonomy in most important areas (N¼ 1240), and (relative) number of
municipalities with more than 52.2 per cent autonomous decisions in the respective areas
Area Decisions
Municipalities
4 10 per cent
Average
autonomy
Municipalities,
4 52.2 per cent
PP&LA 17.5 15 72.6 14 (out of 15)
PH&BC 12.7 14 55.9 10 (out of 14)
PW&R 13.0 13 48.9 5 (out of 13)
T&T 9.0 5 55.5 4 (out of 5)
E&S 9.2 8 54.8 5 (out of 8)
Economic aﬀairs 8.4 5 65.8 5 (out of 5)
PO&S 3.9 0 – –
Social aﬀairs 2.3 0 – –
Tourism 2.2 1 38.5 0 (out of 1)
Cultural aﬀairs 5.8 0 – –
Sports 2.6 0 – –
Education 4.4 0 – –
Public health 1.5 0 – –
Water works 1.1 0 – –
Note: See previous section for the abbreviations of areas.
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as the limit, in nearly every municipality many decisions have been taken in
the areas of physical planning, public housing, and public welfare. In the
areas of traﬃc and transport, environment and economic aﬀairs, the
situation varies per municipality: some pay much attention to it, some do
not. In the remaining areas the boards generally take only a few decisions,
with the exception of tourism in the island of Vlieland. As may also be
noted, in the most important areas autonomy is generally above average
(except for public welfare and tourism), especially in the area of physical
planning. Particularly in public welfare and environment and sanitation the
autonomy scores diﬀer remarkably between municipalities.
Though in quantitative terms municipal boards enjoy a substantial
amount of autonomy, two issues need to be addressed. First, one can argue
that the autonomy should not concern trivial issues but that it should relate
to topics that really matter. Secondly, autonomy also means that there are
no barriers preventing local government from making decisions it had
willing to make: the question of so-called non-decisions.
Importance of the Decisions
An assessment of the importance of decisions is an empirically diﬃcult and
above all rather arbitrary exercise. As Page (2001: 36) has noted in an
analysis of British secondary legislation, ‘importance neither reﬂects the
number of people aﬀected’ (this would imply that a municipal decision to
establish a school is less important than a decision to place traﬃc lights on a
busy crossing), ‘nor the amount of money involved in its application’ (this
would imply that a local decision to place camera surveillance in unsafe
areas is less important than the annual inﬂation correction of local tax
rates). Furthermore, to citizens a decision to place lighting in a pedestrian
tunnel might be much more important than a long-term policy plan on the
socio-economic restructuring of the municipality.
The assessment of how important decisions are is very much a normative
question and depends on what local government ought to be and ought to
do. Though our method in itself does not exclude the application of such
criteria to each decision, we choose to evaluate our scores more objectively
by looking at two characteristics of the decisions.
First, we determined whether a decision relates to more than one area
(whether it requires policy integration). An example of a decision concerning
only one area is a subsidy to a football club (only sports). An example of a
decision requiring policy integration is a plan to renovate a certain part of a
historical inner city by attracting new pubs and shops and the removal of
decayed houses (it relates to tourism, economic aﬀairs, housing, and
physical planning).
Secondly, we ascertained whether a decision held consequences for future
decision-making. An example is the annual budget, which largely
predetermines how money will be spent in the coming year. Another
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example is a zoning plan which contains rules that are being used in the
judgement of future building requests. A decision not setting parameters for
future decision-making is, for example, the acquisition of ground for the
realisation of a kindergarten.
If the number of decisions requiring policy integration and decisions
setting parameters are well represented in the category autonomous
decisions, then we can maintain our conclusion that municipal boards
operate relatively autonomously.
To what extent do the (non)autonomous decisions require policy
integration? Of the total of 1,722 issues to be decided on, 976 (57 per cent)
require policy integration, because they were related to more than one ﬁeld.
Table 4 shows that 43 per cent of the decisions not requiring policy
integration has been taken autonomously. But more importantly, of the
decisions that do require policy integration, a majority has been taken
autonomously (59 per cent). Thus, though the correlation is small
(phi¼ .14), a decision requiring policy integration is more likely to have
been taken autonomously than a decision not requiring policy integration.
This means we can maintain our conclusion that boards operate with a
substantial autonomy.
Table 5 shows that municipal boards take more decisions which do not
set parameters for future decision-making (isolated decisions) than
decisions which hold consequences for future decision-making (214 out
of 1,722, 12.4 per cent). This is understandable since these last decisions
set standards for many other decisions yet to come. Almost half of the
decisions setting parameters for future decision-making have been taken
Table 4. Percentages of decisions (not) requiring policy integration that have been taken non-
autonomously and autonomously (N¼ 1722)
Not requiring policy
integration
Requiring policy
integration
Non-autonomous 56.8 40.9
Autonomous 43.2 59.1
Total 100.0 100.0
N 746 976
Phi¼ 0.14; p¼ 0.00.
Table 5. Percentages of decisions (not) setting parameters for future decision-making that have
been taken non-autonomously and autonomously (N¼ 1722)
Not setting parameters Setting parameters
Non-autonomous 46.5 54.5
Autonomous 53.9 45.5
Total 100.1 100.0
N 1508 214
Phi¼ 0.05; p¼ 0.04.
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autonomously (45 per cent). In the category of isolated decisions 55 per
cent have been taken autonomously. It appears that decisions aﬀecting
future decision-making are more often inﬂuenced by other authorities than
more immediate short-term decisions. This correlation indeed is signiﬁcant
(p¼ 0.04; a¼ 0.05), but nonetheless negligibly small (phi¼ 0.05). We can
reasonably say that the decisions which are setting parameters for future
decision-making are well represented in the autonomous decisions of
municipal boards.
The Question of Non-decisions
A second objection against our method might be that it focuses on actually
made decisions and ignores the possibility of non-decisions. The importance
of the latter, however, is widely acknowledged. Scholars point out that the
autonomy of local government may not only be restricted by the direct
inﬂuence of higher authorities and other organisations, but also by speciﬁc
circumstances like a weak tax base, scarce physical resources or insuﬃcient
economies of scale (Gurr & King, 1987: 43–73; King & Pierre, 1990: 9–12;
Hudson, 1993). Such external factors may form an obstacle for local
government to actually carry out certain initiatives that are nevertheless
considered necessary.
It is argued that non-decisions are very hard to detect as they are not
explicitly documented (Page, 2001), but this does not mean that they are
totally invisible (compare Polsby, 1979). To check the results of our study
for non-decisions, we selected four municipalities out of our sample for in-
depth research: the historical city of Gouda (pop. 72,000), the old mining
town of Kerkrade (pop. 51,000), the newly – in 1972 – established
municipality of Dronten, situated on reclaimed land (pop. 35,500) and the
commuter town of IJsselstein (pop. 32,000). The ﬁrst two municipalities are
urban towns with relatively poor populations and scarce physical resources.
The other two have relatively small populations and the corresponding low
budgets might have prevented the municipal boards taking the necessary
initiatives.
In these four municipalities we carried out a qualitative study into all
reports of the council meetings, in particular into debates on the annual
budget. These documents are the most appropriate ones for detecting non-
decisions, as (unattainable) policy desires are most likely expressed in this
municipal political body. Moreover, the minutes of council meetings are a
complete literal rendering of the debate. Additionally, all sorts of general
policy documents like long-range plans and annual accounts were studied.
In order to increase the chance to detect non-decisions – and thereby
maximise the possibility to reject our results – the minutes and other
archives for the period 1990–95 were examined closely.
When can we speak of a non-decision? First of all it is a policy desire that
cannot be fulﬁlled and is consequently not decided upon. Yet we should be
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aware that councillors will always have certain policy wishes that cannot be
executed, no matter how many physical or ﬁnancial resources their
municipality has. Councillors may also be swayed by the issues of the day
or they may put forward obviously unrealistic and strongly politically
coloured demands. In order to prevent arbitrary judgements in the
assessment of whether there is a non-decision, we have formulated the
following additional criteria. The policy desire is:
. broadly supported, i.e. by both board and council members;
. frequently expressed in at least two consecutive years.
We have not found non-decisions in the period 1990–95. Yet, to test whether
our method is sensitive enough, we applied the method also to the period
1960–90. In this period we detected some non-decisions in two of the four
aforementioned municipalities.
In the beginning of the 1960s the council and board members of Gouda
complained about chronic lack of building land, there being a persistent and
severe housing shortage and an urgent need for renewal of the old city centre.
Only after an adjustment of the municipal borders in 1964 – made possible by
an Act of Parliament – by which the Gouda territory almost doubled, did
these complaints fade away. Our observation that this is a case of non-
decision is supported by the results of the quantitative analysis. Before the
adjustment of the municipal borders the boards took relatively few decisions
(45 versus around 100 in later years) and relatively few were taken on the
boards’ own initiative (45 versus 60 per cent in later years). After the
adjustment of the municipal borders the boards’ attention to physical
planning and public housing doubled (from 11 per cent in 1963 to 20 per cent
in 1968) and the amount of autonomous decisions rose to the average level.
In the former mining town of Kerkrade a severe economic crisis came
about after the closure of the mines. This closure was ordered by central
government in the late 1960s. In the council meetings the crisis led to
persistent tirades against central government. It was held responsible for all
economic problems and for local impotence in coping with the regional
crisis, which would last until the late 1980s. This impotence is reﬂected in
the board’s agenda. The percentage of decisions aimed at improving the
economic state of aﬀairs has generally been less than ten per cent, even in the
early 1970s when population ﬁgures dropped and unemployment ﬁgures
rose 20 per cent in ﬁve years. On the other hand, and despite lamentations in
the council, there was growing awareness that Kerkrade would never be able
to solve the regional problems by itself. Local authorities reconciled
themselves more or less to the idea that their municipality was just too small
to solve the problem. Therefore they accepted that central, provincial and
functional authorities (like the Chamber of Commerce and development
banks) took the main responsibility for tackling the problems. They were
best equipped to transform the economic structure in the Kerkrade region.
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Our conclusion is that our method to ﬁnd non-decisions is suﬃciently
sensitive to detect them had they occurred in the period 1990–95. Based on
this we feel safe in assuming that the possibility of non-decisions does not
force us to revise our earlier ﬁndings.
To Conclude
In studies of intergovernmental relations, (de)centralisation and local
autonomy many scholars follow a deductive approach. Typical of these
studies is that indicators at the national or macro level are used to deduce
the extent of local autonomy. In the case of the Netherlands this has resulted
in a generally very negative view on the extent local government enjoys
autonomy. Some scholars even judged that local autonomy has completely
waned.
Alternatively, in this paper we developed a method for studying local
autonomy by taking as the object of analysis local decision-making practice,
relating this to the activities of other governmental and non-governmental
actors. We implemented this method through a quantitative content analysis
of decisions of municipal boards, complemented with supportive interviews.
As far as the period 1990–95 is concerned our decision-making approach yields
much less negative conclusions than the ones drawn by those who have taken a
deductive approach. In general, around half of the municipal decisions have
been taken autonomously; that is, the municipal board has taken the decision
on its own initiative (and was not forced by other governments), with freedom
of choice, and without the necessity for cooperation of other governmental
actors. This conclusion could be maintained after studying the possibility of
the presence of non-decisions, and the possibility that autonomous decisions
are mainly less important decisions.
Although in general the autonomy in the 16 municipalities studied is
larger than one might expect when adhering to the deductive perspective, we
have noted diﬀerences between municipalities. Also, municipalities vary
with respect to the policy areas they are mainly engaged in. These diﬀerences
can be explained by the fact that the priorities of municipalities diﬀer,
depending on the speciﬁc economical, demographical, social or physical
situation of the community in question.
To what extent can our decision-making method be applied elsewhere and
will it lead to similar results? Regarding methodology, we see one obvious
reason why it cannot be applied in other contexts, and that is the
unavailability of a written archive in which decisions of the main municipal
body – be it a board, a council, a mayor or a combination – have been
recorded. From a theoretical point of view, application of our method might
yield the same results in those administrative systems where according to the
deductive approach local autonomy is small; that is, in unitary states as the
Netherlands. On the other hand, application of our method in federal
systems might not lead to the detection of more autonomy, as according to a
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deductive perspective sub-national authorities already enjoy a fair degree of
autonomy. Probably this particularly holds for the relation between the
federal level and the tier directly beneath. Application of our method within
the states of a federal system might still detect a greater autonomy of
municipalities towards e.g. German La¨nder, Swiss Kantons, Belgian
gewesten, or American states, than one would expect using a deductive
approach.
References
Agranoﬀ, R. (2004) JPART symposium introduction: researching intergovernmental relations,
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 14(4), pp.443–446.
Blair, P. (1991) Trends in local autonomy and democracy: reﬂections from a European
perspective’, in: R. Batley & G. Stoker (Eds) Local Government in Europe. Trends and
Developments (London: MacMillan), pp.41–58.
Carmichael, P. & Midwinter, A. (2002) Regulating Local Authorities. Emerging Patterns of
Central Control, special issue Local Government Studies, 28(3).
Denters, S.A.H. (1989) Gemeentelijke politiek, in: R.B. Andeweg, A. Hoogerwerf & J.J.A.
Thomassen (Eds) Politiek in Nederland (Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom), pp.323–346.
Do¨lle, A.H.M. & Elzinga, D.J. (1996) Lokaal Bestuur als Fundament van het Binnenlands
Bestuur, in: W. Derksen & W.G.M. Salet (Eds) Bouwen aan het Binnenlands Bestuur (The
Hague: SDU), pp.67–82.
Elzinga Committee (1999) Dualisme en Lokale Democratie (Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom).
EU/Committee of the Regions (2001) Regional and Local Government in the European Union.
Responsibilities and resources (Luxemburg: EU).
Fesler, J.W. (1965) Approaches to the understanding of decentralization, The Journal of
Politics, 27(3), pp.536–566.
Fleurke, F. & Willemse, R. (2004) Approaches to decentralization and local autonomy. A
critical appraisal, Administrative Theory and Praxis, 26(4), pp.523–544.
Goldsmith, M.J. (1990) Local autonomy: theory and practice, in: D.S. King & J. Pierre (Eds)
Challenges to Local Government (London: Sage), pp.15–36.
Goldsmith, M.J. (1995) Autonomy and city limits, in: D. Judge, G. Stoker & H. Wolman (Eds)
Theories of Urban Politics (London: Sage), pp.228–252.
Gurr, T.R. & King, D.S. (1987) The State and the City (Basingstoke: MacMillan).
Gustaﬀson, A. (1991) The changing local government and politics of Sweden, in: R. Batley &
G. Stoker (Eds) Local Government in Europe. Trends and Developments (London:
MacMillan), pp.170–190.
Hagelstein, G.H. (1993) De Verhouding Tussen Algemeen en Functioneel Bestuur: Naar
Bestuur op Maat, in: G.H. Hagelstein, H.J. de Ru, J.L. Boxum & L.J.A. Damen (Eds)
Functioneel Bestuur (Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink), pp.89–106.
Hansen, T. & Klausen, J.E. (2002) Between the welfare state and local government autonomy,
Local Government Studies, 28(2), pp.47–66.
Havermans, A.J.E. (1998) Gemeentelijke Taken en Financie¨n, in: A.F.A. Korsten & P.W. Tops
(Eds) Lokaal Bestuur in Nederland (Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom), pp.77–103.
Hennekens, H.Ph.J.A.M. (1996) De Schaal voor het Lokale Bestuur, Bestuurswetenschappen,
50(6), pp.474–483.
Hennekens, H.Ph.J.A.M. (2000) De Gemeente Verbouwd, Niet Versterkt!, Bestuurskunde, 9(2),
pp.62–66.
Hudson, C. (1993) Against All Odds. Local Economic Development Policies and Local
Government Autonomy in Sweden and Britain (Umea: University of Umea).
Joumard, I. & Kongsrud, P.M. (2003) Fiscal Relations across Government Levels (OECD:
Paris).
86 F. Fleurke & R. Willemse
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 A
ms
te
rd
am
] 
At
: 
15
:3
0 
31
 M
ay
 2
01
1
King, D.S. & Pierre, J. (Eds) (1990) Challenges to Local Government (London: Sage).
Lijphart, A. (1984) Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-
One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press).
Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six
Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press).
Loughlin, J. (2001) Introduction: the transformation of the democratic state in Western
Europe’, in: J. Loughlin (Ed.) Subnational Democracy in the European Union. Challenges and
Opportunities (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.1–33.
Norton, A. (1991) West European local government in comparative perspective’, in: R. Batley
& G. Stoker (Eds) Local Government in Europe. Trends and Developments (London:
MacMillan), pp.21–41.
Norton, A. (1994) International Handbook of Local and Regional Government. A Comparative
Analysis of Advanced Democracies (Aldershot: Edward Elgar).
OECD (1997) Managing Across Levels of Government (Paris: OECD).
Page, E.C. (1991) Localism and Centralism in Europe. The Political and Legal Bases of Local
Self-Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Page, E.C. (2001) Government by Numbers. Delegated Legislation and Everyday Policy-Making
(Oxford: Hart Publishing).
Page, E.C. & Goldsmith, M.J. (Eds) (1987) Central and Local Government Relations. A
Comparative Analysis of West European Unitary States (London: Sage).
Peters, B.G. & Pierre, J. (2001) Developments in intergovernmental relations: towards multi-
level governance, Policy and Politics, 29(2), pp.131–136.
Polsby, N.W. (1979) Empirical investigations of mobilization of bias in community power
research, Political Studies, 27(4), pp.527–541.
Rolla, G. (1998) Autonomy: a guiding criterion for decentralizing public administration,
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 64(1), pp.27–39.
Sharpe, L.J. (1988) The growth and decentralisation of the modern democratic state, European
Journal of Political Research, 16(3), pp.365–380.
Smith, B.C. (1979) The Measurement of Decentralization, International Review of Adminis-
trative Sciences, 45(3), pp.214–222.
Smith, B.C. (1985) Decentralization. The Territorial Dimension of the State (London: Allen &
Unwin).
Tops, P.W. & Depla, P. (1993) Vernieuwing van de Lokale Democratie: Een Ordening van de
Discussie, Acta Politica, 28(3), pp.327–361.
Veldheer, V. (1994) Kantelend Bestuur (Rijswijk: SCP).
Verhoest, K, Peters, B.G., Bouckaert, G. & Verschuere, B. (2004) The study of organisational
autonomy: a conceptual review, Public Administration and Development, 24(2), pp.101–118.
Wagenaar, F.P. & Rutgers, M. (2004) Caught between polis and empire. On centralization and
decentralization in public administration theory, Administrative Theory and Praxis, 27(4),
pp.509–522.
Willemse, R. (2004) B&W-besluitvorming in Diachronisch Perspectief. Een Onderzoek naar
Gemeentelijk Initiatief in de Laatste Decennia, Bestuurswetenschappen, 58(1), pp.34–49.
Wolman, H. (1990) Decentralization: what it is, in: R.J. Bennet (Ed.) Decentralization, Local
Governments, and Markets. Towards a Post-Welfare Agenda (Oxford: Clarendon Press),
pp.29–41.
Wolman, H. & Goldsmith, M.J. (1990) Local autonomy as a meaningful concept. Comparing
local government in the United States and in the United Kingdom, Urban Aﬀairs Quarterly,
26(1), pp.3–27.
WRR/Scientiﬁc Council for Government Policy (1995) Orde in het Binnenlands Bestuur (The
Hague: SDU).
Measuring Local Autonomy 87
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 A
ms
te
rd
am
] 
At
: 
15
:3
0 
31
 M
ay
 2
01
1
